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Abstract
This paper develops a quantitative general equilibrium model of sovereign default with hetero-
geneous agents to account for spillover of default risk across countries. Borrowers (sovereign
governments) and foreign lenders (investors) in the model face financial frictions, which endoge-
nously determine each agent’s credit condition. Due to lack of enforcement in sovereign debt,
borrowing constraints for the governments are endogenous to incentives to default for the gov-
ernments. On the other hand, investors who hold a portfolio of sovereign debts face a collateral
constraint that limits their leverage of investment in sovereign debts. When the collateral con-
straint for investors binds due to a decrease in the value of collateral, triggered by a high default
risk for one country, credit constrained investors ask for liquidity premiums even to countries in
which there is no worsening of domestic fundamentals. This increase in the cost of borrowing,
in turn, increases incentives to default for other countries with normal fundamentals, further
constraining investors in obtaining credit through a decrease in the value of collateral. The in-
terplay of each agent’s credit condition generates a bad spiral through which we observe spread
of default risk across countries. In a quantitative analysis, the model is calibrated to Greece and
Spain, and predicts (1) that cross-county correlation in sovereign spreads between Greece and
Spain increases significantly during a crisis period, and (2) that Spain’s default rate, conditional
on Greece’ default, increases about three times compared to Spain’s unconditional default rate.
The model’s predictions are consistent with the recent European debt crisis.
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Figure 1.1: 10 Year Government Bond Yields across Several European Countries
Note: The period runs from January 1st in 2008 through 2011. Source:Bloomberg.
1 Introduction
The recent European debt crisis has ignited a debate about channels for contagion of sovereign
default risk. Since the Asian financial crisis of 1997, there have been numerous studies about
contagion of financial crises. However, relatively little research has been conducted on contagion of
sovereign default risk. Figure 1 plots 10-year government bond yields for several European countries
from the beginning of 2008 through the end of 2011. This figure shows that since April 23rd in 2010
when Greek government requested the first bail-out funds from European Central Bank and IMF, 10
year Greek government bond yields soared up, and along the way, government bond yields for several
countries such as Ireland, Portugal, and Spain have substantially increased, suggesting a possibility
that the default risk originating in Greece has spread to these countries. The contagion of sovereign
default risk is, however, not unique to the recent European debt crisis. We have already observed
that during Mexico’s tequila crisis of 1994, Mexico’s neighboring countries such as Argentina and
Brazil also suﬀered from an increase in their sovereign bond yields.
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Table 1: Pairwise Correlation in Sovereign Spreads for Selected European Countries with Greece
during the Stable and Crisis Period
Country Stable Period Crisis Period
Ireland 0.07 (0.05) 0.65 (0.17)
Spain 0.23 (0.05) 0.68 (0.16)
Portugal 0.19 (0.05) 0.81(0.13)
Italy 0.71 (0.04) 0.97 (0.06)
France 0.55 (0.05) 0.63 (0.17)
Note: The stable period is from Jan.1 in 2009 to Apr 22th in 2010. The crisis period is a month starting on April 23rd in 2010.
Source: Bloomberg. The frequency of the data is daily. Figures in parenthesis are standard errors of correlation coeﬃcients.
Despite an extensive literature on financial contagion, there is not yet a uniform definition
of what constitutes contagion.1 However, the term contagion generally refers to the spread of bad
market disturbances, from one country to another. Accordingly, most empirical studies on contagion
focus on a significant increase in cross-market linkages after a shock to an individual country (Greece
in the recent European debt crisis), which is observed through “excessive” co-movements in exchange
rates, stock prices, and sovereign spreads. If contagion of sovereign default risk occurred during the
recent European debt crisis, we would see a significant increase in cross-country correlations in
sovereign spreads between Greece and other countries during the recent crisis period compared to
the stable period before the crisis started.
Table 1 compares the pairwise cross-country correlations of sovereign spreads on 10 year gov-
ernment bonds for selected European countries with Greek government sovereign spreads between
the stable and crisis period. The stable period is defined as the period from the beginning of
2009 through April 22nd in 2010, a day before Greek government requested the first bail-out funds
from ECB and IMF.2 The crisis period is one month starting on April 23rd in 2010.3 The spread
is calculated as the diﬀerence between 10 year government bond yields and German bond yields
with identical bond structures. The European countries included in the table are Ireland, Spain,
Portugal, Italy, and France. Sovereign spread data are daily and are from Bloomberg.
1Claessens, Stijn, Rudiger W. Dornbusch, and Yung Chul Park, 2001, Contagion: Why crises spread and how this
can be stopped, in Stijn Claessens, and Kristin J Forbes, eds: International Financial Contagion(Kluwer Academic
Publishers, Norwell, MA)
2Even though there are several candidates for the starting date of crisis, April 23rd in 2010 is considered by most
media and policy makers to be the date in which Greece debt crisis started.
3Using one month for the crisis period is conventional in the empirical work on test for contagion. I do not use a
longer length of time for the stable time because of the fact that the structural change might happen over the longer
period.
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We can see from Table 1 that during the crisis, there is a significant increase in cross-country
correlations in sovereign spreads with Greece where the current crisis originates. Even if there are
still a lot of ongoing debates on what constitutes contagion, this significant increase in cross-country
correlations during the crisis period suggests that spread of default risk actually occurred during
the recent European debt crisis.
This paper proposes a financial channel through which one country’s sovereign default risk
spreads to other countries in a quantitative dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous
agents. In analyzing the financial channel for contagion of sovereign default risk, I focus on the role of
two financial frictions, one for sovereign borrowers (sovereign governments) and the other for lenders
(sovereign debt specialists), and the interplay of credit conditions determined by these two financial
frictions will be at the core of analysis, generating contagion as well as a vicious cycle leading up
to a crisis. For sovereign borrowers, there is lack of enforcement in sovereign debt contracts due
to sovereignty: in the event of default, no foreign creditors can enforce repayments nor seize any
assets of sovereign debtors within its border. On the other hand, when foreign investors borrow
from international financial markets in order to invest in sovereign debts, they face a collateral
constraint that limits the amount of borrowing and that closely resembles a margin clause that
most investment bankers face in the real world.
There has been plenty of research on the eﬀect of a financial friction facing sovereign governments
since Eaton and Gersovitz (1981). As first pointed out in Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), due to the lack
of enforcement in sovereign debt, a default decision by the government depends on the willingness
to pay, not on the ability to pay. That is, the sovereign government optimally chooses to default
on its external debt whenever it is better oﬀ with default, even if the government can aﬀord to
repay. Due to this nature of sovereign default, one country’s default decision is sensitive to a cost of
borrowing. An increase in the cost of borrowing increases incentives to default for the government
who needs to roll over external debts coming due, and this, in turn, increases the cost of borrowing
for the sovereign government, because foreign lenders will ask for higher risk-premiums due to the
increased likelihood of default of the country. If Greece’s crisis increases the borrowing cost of other
countries by negatively aﬀecting investors’ credit conditions, this will increase incentives to default
for other countries by making their rolling-over of the current debt costly. At the same time, this
increase in incentives to default will be reflected in an increase in spreads for those countries.
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On the other hand, the financial friction facing foreign investors who specialize in lending to
sovereign countries also plays a crucial role in generating contagion in this model. This is a new
aspect of our model that has so far been little addressed in the literature of sovereign debt and
default. The importance of the role of investors in explaining sovereign spreads is emphasized by a
recent empirical study by Longstaﬀ et al (2011). They find that there is commonality in sovereign
spreads and that this commonality is related to foreign creditors’ credit conditions. Moreover,
empirical studies on financial contagion by Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000,2003) find that financial
links through common bank lenders are among the most important contagion channels for financial
contagion occured since 1990s. Given the fact that a majority of Greek government bonds are
owned by European commercial banks4, investigating the role of foreign investors in accounting for
the recent European debt crisis is important.
The risk-averse investors in the model hold a portfolio of diﬀerent sovereign bonds5 and make
a portfolio choice each period. They leverage their investment in sovereign bonds with funds (short
term loans) obtained from international financial markets. However, foreign investors face a collat-
eral constraint that restricts their borrowing from international financial markets: the amount of
borrowing from international financial markets must not exceed a certain fraction of the value of the
collateral. Moreover, the value of collateral depends on the market value of the investors’ portfolio.
The interaction of credit conditions for sovereign borrowers and lenders associated with the two
financial frictions is a key mechanism for contagion of sovereign default in the model. Contagion
occurs in the following way. Suppose that a bad income shock hits a country (Greece), which leads
to an increase in default risk for the country (Greece). This leads to a decrease in the price of the
country’s bond in the investors’ portfolio, hence lowering the market value of the investors’ portfolio.
The decrease in the value of the portfolio also lowers the value of collateral, constraining investors in
borrowing from international financial markets. Credit (liquidity) constrained investors, in turn, ask
for liquidity premiums on other sovereign bonds whose domestic fundamentals are not deteriorating.
Higher liquidity premiums translate into a higher cost of borrowing, thus increasing incentives to
default for countries even with normal fundamentals. Then, a vicious cycle is set in motion. In this
paper, crises similar to the European debt crisis start when the investors’ collateral constraint binds
4A recent survey by Barclays Capital shows that around 70% of Greek government debt is owned by European
financial institutions including public institutions such as ECB and central banks in Eurozone.
5Hence, countries in investors’ portfolio are linked through common lenders.
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(i.e., margin call). One country’s default risk aﬀects credit conditions for investors, which, in turn,
aﬀects the cost of borrowing for other countries. And this again increases the incentive to default
for other countries, making investors further credit-constrained through a decrease in the value of
collateral. This is the main financial channel for contagion in this paper.
The model is calibrated to Greece and Spain, which are considered to be among the countries hit
hardest by the recent European debt crisis. However, the two countries are diﬀerent in terms of the
cost of default. This is a main source of heterogeneity in the model, which generates diﬀerent default
rates and mean spreads in simulations. In quantitative studies, the model predicts a significant
increase in cross-country correlations in sovereign spreads between the two coutries during a crisis
period, which is in line with the one observed during the recent European crisis. Moreover, the
model predicts that Spain’s default rate, conditional on Greece’s default, increases about three
times compared to Spain’s unconditional default rate. A counterfactual analysis in which investors
are assumed to be risk-neutral and not credit constrained as in most of quantitative sovereign
default studies, shows that the financial channel in this paper plays an important role in generating
contagion.
Related Literature
With the exception of a few recent papers, the sovereign debt literature has not paid much attention
to contagion of sovereign default risk. Since Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) and Arellano (2008),
most quantitative sovereign default studies6 have focused on the role of sovereign default risk in
generating unique business cycle dynamics of emerging economies, while being silent about how
sovereign default risk spreads to other countries, even though most sovereign defaults occurred in
bunches in history. Another strand of research on sovereign default has focused on the issue of crisis
resolution, bailouts, and debt restructuring. While this literature can give important lessons for
the resolution of the European debt crisis, it does not provide a good understanding of a financial
mechanism for contagion of sovereign default, which is necessary for understanding the current
European debt crisis.
On the other hand, there has been a growing number of studies on contagion of financial crises
6A short list includes Aguiar and Gopinath (2006), Hatchondo, Martinez and Sapriza (2008), and Mendoza and
Yue (2011)
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since the Asian crisis of 1997. A number of plausible explanations for contagion and spread of
financial crises have been proposed, but most of these explanations have not utilized the unique
feature of sovereign debt crises, lack of enforcement in sovereign debt, which plays a crucial role
in generating contagion in this paper. However, the closest contagion channel in the literature of
financial crises to this paper is the portfolio recomposition channel, the channel studied by Choueri
(1999) and Schinasi and Smith (1999) among others. Using theoretical frameworks, they show
that contagion can occur if investors are rebalancing their portfolio by liquidating their assets in
responding to a negative shock to returns on specific assets. Liquidating assets puts a downward
pressure on the price of other assets, which do not suﬀer from any negative shocks, thus generating a
spread. Following this idea, Lizarazo (2010) develops a quantitative model of contagion of sovereign
default on the framework of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) in which the crucial mechanism of contagion
is that after making a loss due to a country’s default, a foreign lender with preferences that exhibit
decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) asks for higher risk-premiums on other countries’ sovereign
debt. However, in our paper, the key mechanism is the interaction of credit constraints for investors
and sovereign borrowers, not the contagion channel due to the wealth eﬀect. In our model, the key
factor generating higher spreads during crisis is liquidity premiums that credit constrained investors
demand during a crisis. Arellano and Bai (2012) extends Lizarazo (2010) by introducing a debt
renegotiation problem to study the contagion channel of sovereign default risk. In their model, the
key channel for contagion comes from strategic interactions of borrowers in Cournot competition.
This paper is also related to another strand of literature that studies the eﬀects of “occasionally
binding” borrowing constraints on macroeconomic behaviors of small open economies. By extend-
ing Aiyagari and Gertler (1999) to an open economy setting, Mendoza and Smith (2006) shows the
collateral constraint whose value of collateral is linked to a small open economy’s domestic funda-
mental can generate volatile economic dynamics in line with ones observed in the crises of emerging
market economies of 20th century. However, their studies do not consider sovereign default crises,
which are the main focus of our paper.
Bolton and Jeanne (2011) also studies contagion of sovereign default risk in financially integrated
economies under the assumption that domestic banks use sovereign bonds as collateral for interbank
loans. In their model, changes in the value of a portfolio responding to changes in default risk play a
key role in generating contagion of a crisis. In a simple three period model, they show that domestic
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Figure 2.1: Two Groups of Small Open Economies
GROUP 1 GROUP 2
banks’ incentive to diversify a portfolio of sovereign debt generates risk diversification benefits
ex ante, but it generates contagion ex post. However, their model does not feature endogenous
government default decisions as in Eaton and Gersovitz (1981).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the economic environment and
the theoretical framework. Section 3 analyzes the quantitative implications of the benchmark model
and conducts a counterfactual analysis. Section 4 concludes.
2 Model
This section describes the model and defines the recursive equilibrium of the economy. Time is dis-
crete and infinite t = 0, 1, . . .. There are two groups of small open economies in this model. In each
group, there is a continuum of identical small open countries in each of which there are a represen-
tative household and a sovereign government. A representative household in each country in both
groups receives a stochastic stream of identical tradable consumption goods each period. A benev-
olent government in each country maximizes the welfare of its representative household by making
one of two choices: borrowing from foreign investors or defaulting on its debt. There is a sovereign
debt market which is populated by a large number of risk-averse investors who trade one period
non-contingent bonds with each government. When lending to each government (i.e., investing in
government bonds), investors can obtain funds from international financial markets at a risk-free rate
to leverage its investment in government debts. The sovereign debt market is assumed to be com-
petitive. There is no borrowing or lending between sovereign governments; sovereign governments
trade only with investors in sovereign debt markets. Both borrowers (sovereign governments) and
lenders (foreign investors) have perfect information regarding each country’s endowment process.
The asset market is both incomplete and imperfect: incomplete due to the fact that the asset that
8
borrowers (sovereign governments) and lenders (foreign investors) trade is restricted to one period
non-contingent bonds. Imperfect due to the two financial frictions: (1) Sovereign debt contracts
are not enforceable, and (2) foreign investors are facing a collateral constraint (liquidity constraint)
which limits their leverage in sovereign debt investment.
In what follows, the script i denotes variables corresponding to the Group i. A lowercase letter
indicates an individual state variable for a small open economy in each group whereas a uppercase
letter an aggregate state variable.
2.1 State Variables
Let S be a vector of aggregate state variables characterizing the state of the world. There is a tuple
of state variables Si = (Y it , Bit) specific to Group i 2 {1, 2} : a current endowment Y it and a current
bond holding Bit for group i. There is also a state variable specific to the investor Sinv = Xt, which
is the amount of funds that investors obtained last period from international financial markets.
Then, S can be written as follows:
S = S1 ⇥ S2 ⇥ Sinv (2.1)
2.2 Timeline
The timing of actions within each period is :
• At the beginning of the period, the state of the world S is observed by sovereign governments
in both groups and investors.
• Investors oﬀer a menu of bond prices (a bond price schedule) to each sovereign government in
both groups, and taking this menu as given, each sovereign government decides to default or
not.
• If a government decides not to default, the government trades one-period bonds with investors
in a sovereign debt market after repaying its current debt.
• When a government defaults on its debt, the debt is erased from budget constraints for the
economy and investors. In the default period, however, the defaulting economy incurs an
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output cost associated with default. The next period, the government resumes trading with
investors with zero debt.
2.3 Sovereign Governments and Households
I follow Arellano (2008) in specifying the economic environment regarding a sovereign government
who makes a borrowing and default decision. Each country in group i 7is populated by one govern-
ment and a representative household who receives a stochastic endowment at each period Y it , which
is a tradable consumption good.8 The representative household in this country has the preference
given by
E0
1X
t=0
 tiu(c
i
t) (2.2)
where cit denotes consumption at period t,  i 2 (0, 1) the time discount factor for households in group
i. The utility function u(·) is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and satisfies Inada conditions.
The endowment Y it is assumed to have a compact support and to be a Markov process.
The government is benevolent and its objective is to maximize the expected discounted utility
of the household. At the beginning of each period, each government in group i decides whether
to default or not on its debt, after comparing the value of default and not-default. However, since
countries in each group are small, sovereign governments in each group act as if their decisions
regarding default and borrowing do not aﬀect a law of motion for aggregate state variables, which
determine current and future prices for their borrowing.9 As we see later in more detail, however,
the decisions of an individual government in group i coincides with the decisions of the group i in
equilbrium (aggregate consistency condition). Besides a vector of aggregate state variables S, there
is an additional individual state variable for a country in group i : the current bond holding (debt)
bit.10
7Since countries in each group are identical, we can think of this setting as the case in which there is one represen-
tative small open economy in each group but the government in each representative small open economy takes prices
and motions for aggregate variables as given.
8Tradable goods for both groups are identical, so the relative price between two goods is one.
9If we assume that each government can internalize the eﬀect of their default and borrowing decisions on the
law of motion for aggregate state varaibles, which determines the country’s credit condition, they will exploit this
opportunity by behaving strategically as in a game theoretical setting. Arellano and Bai (2012) study this strategic
behaviors of multiple sovereign governments to account for contagion of sovereign default risk. To prevent this
strategic interaction, this model features “Big B and little b” trick, which is very similar to so called “Big K and little
k” trick, which is used to compute a competitive allocation in a closed economy setting.
10bit > 0 means that the government i holds a positive bond holding, whereas bit < 0 means that the government i
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The value of the option to default for the government in group i is given by:
V io (b
i
t, St) = max
nd,d
{V ind(bit, St), V id (bit, St)}, (2.3)
where V ind denotes the value of repaying the debt (not default) and V
i
d the value of default. When
the government decides to default, its default decision function di(bit, St) takes on the value of one,
and zero otherwise.
Value of Repayment
When the government decides to repay its debt, the government trades one-period discount bonds
bit+1 with investors in a sovereign debt market, taking the bond price function (bond price schedule)
qi(bit+1, St) as given. The bond price function shows how costly or lenient external borrowing is to
each sovereign government and determines endogenous credit limits for the government. Note that
the bond price function qi(bit+1, St) depends not only on bit+1 but also on the aggregate state of the
world St, which includes state variables for the other group S i as well as investors’ credit condition
Sinv.
The government rebates back to households all the proceedings from its trading with investors
in a lump sum fashion. Hence, when the government pays back its debt, the resource constraint for
the country i reads
cit = Y
i
t + b
i
t   qit(bit+1, St)bit+1 (2.4)
Hence, the sovereign government rolls over its current debt bit with a new borrowing from in-
vestors, which is  qit(bit+1, St)bit+1. A value function of no-default (repayment) for the country i is
written in a recursive way:
V ind(b
i
t, B
1
t , B
2
t , Y
1
t , Y
2
t , Xt) = max
bit+1,c
i
t
u(cit) +  
iEt[Vo(b
i
t+1, B
1
t+1, B
2
t+1, Y
1
t+1, Y
2
t+1, Xt+1)] (2.5)
subject to the resource constraint equaion (2.4).
is indebted.
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Value of Default
When the government defaults on its debt, the government is not allowed to trade with investors.
In addition, the economy suﬀers an output cost of default hi(Y it )   0 that lowers the economy’s
income to Y defi,t ⌘(Y it   hi(Y it )). The economy in default must consume Y defi,t , which is less than or
equal to her income shock Y it . That is,
cdefi,t = Y
def
i,t (2.6)
This output cost of default is standard in quantitative studies of sovereign default based on Eaton
and Gersovitz (1981) and is related to the negative eﬀects of sovereign default on the domestic
output, usually through disruption in economic activity caused by collapse of domestic financial
systems after a government’s default.11
Unlike most quantitative models of sovereign default, I assume that the defaulting government
resumes trading with investors in the period following default, with all the debt written oﬀ from the
economy’s budget constraint.12 This assumption is related to the structure of the sovereign debt
market in the model: the sovereign debt market is competitive. In a competitive sovereign debt
market, it is hard to justify that investors are able to collude to exclude defaulting governments
from credit markets for a certain period as a punishment. Several empirical studies including
Wright (2005) suggest that sovereign debt markets have become more competitive over the last
three decades.
Two groups of economies diﬀer in the output cost of default hi(·), which is a main source
of heterogeneity across groups in the model. This heterogeneity can be thought of as reflecting
structural diﬀerences among countries including political instability. Countries with a high cost of
default would be less likely to default than those with a low cost of default.
11It has been well documented in many empirical studies that sovereign default is, for most of the time, accompanied
with a huge decrease in the economy’s output. For example, Argentina’s GDP decreased by 10% in 2001 when
Argentina’s government defaulted on her sovereign debt.
12Most papers in quantitative studies of sovereign default assume exclusion of sovereign government from credit mar-
kets for a certain period of time as an additional punishment of default. See, for example, Aguiar and Gopinath(2006)
and Arellano(2008), among others. However, Hatchondo and Martinez(2009) assume no exclusion from credit markets
in case of default.
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The value of default for government i can be written recursively:
V id (b
i
t, B
1
t , B
2
t , Y
1
t , Y
2
t , Xt) = u(Y
i
t   hi(Y it )) +  iE[V io (0, B1t+1, B2t+1, Y 1t , Y 2t , Xt+1)] (2.7)
Note that when a government decides to default, the bond holding for the next period is zero,
meaning that the current debt is written oﬀ upon defaulting.
When making a default or borrowing choice from investors, the atomistic government in each
group takes as given the following law of motion for aggregate state variables as well as default
decisions for each group of countries:
B1t+1 =  B1(St) (2.8)
B2t+1 =  B2(St) (2.9)
Xt+1 =  X(St) (2.10)
D1t =  1(St) (2.11)
D2t =  2(St) (2.12)
The solution to a government’s problem provides two decision functions for (1) default dit(bit, St)
and (2) future borrowing bit+1 = bit+1(bit, St).
Discussion of the Government’s Default Decision
Due to lack of enforcement in sovereign debt, the sovereign government’s default decision depends
on the government incentives to repay debt, meaning that each period, the government compares
the value of default and repayment even if the country has assets with which to pay back the debt
(i.e., the government is solvent). Despite the output cost of default, the government decides to
default, because at a certain bad state of the world S, the government can not find any financial
contract {qi(bit+1, St), bit+1} that increases current consumption by rolling over its current debt bt.
Recall that the consumption in case of repayment is:
cit = e
i
t + b
i
t   qi(bit+1, St)bit+1 (2.13)
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The government rolls over its current debt bit with new borrowing of  qi(bit+1, St)bit+1. If the
cost of borrowing represented by qi(·) is too high (a low bond price) for the country in group i, the
value of repayment would be lower, because borrowing from investors does not help much to finance
households’ consumption, especially in the face of adverse income shocks. Hence, if the government
finds it very costly to borrow from sovereign debt markets, the government rather chooses to default,
which makes the country better oﬀ even with the output cost of default. Since the bond price
function depends on Si as well as the other group’s economic conditions S i, crises such as the
other group’s default can translate into a high borrowing cost of countries by adversely aﬀecting
investors’ credit condtions, which, in turn, will increase incentives to default for the countries, even if
there is no worsening of economic fundamentals for the countries in group i. However, this increased
incentives to default for the countries in group i will be reflected in a higher cost of borrowing for
the countries, further increasing incentives to default and possibly leading to contagion. In the next
subsection, we will see that another financial friction facing investors reinforces incentives to default
for countries in each group.
2.4 Investors
In a sovereign debt market, there are a large number of identical risk-averse investors who
specialize in investing in sovereign debt. Their preferences are defined over a stream of consumption
goods {cInvt }t=0,1, given by
E0
1X
t=0
 tinvu(c
Inv
t ) , (2.14)
where  inv denotes the time discount factor for investors, cInvt consumption at period t.  inv is
assumed to be greater than { i}i=1,2 , the time discount factor for households in group i, in order
to induce sovereign governments in each group to borrow from investors in equilibrium. Investors
receive a constant amount of tradable consumption goods   each period. In addition, they can
obtain one-period loans xt+1 from international financial markets with an exogenous world risk-free
interest rate of rf , to finance its investments in sovereign debt and their consumption. Finally, we
assume that sovereign debt markets are competitive.
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At each period, investors decide how much to consume, how much to invest in sovereign bonds
from each group (i.e., making a portfolio choice), and how much to borrow from international finan-
cial markets. The representative investor is subject to a financial friction that limits his borrowing
from international financial markets: he must pledge a certain fraction of his assets as collateral in
order to borrow from international financial markets. Given this collateral constraint, the investor
makes a portfolio choice on diﬀerent sovereign bonds.
A representative investor’s flow budget constraint is :
cInvt +
1
1 + rf
xt+1 +
X
i
(1 Dit)Qit✓it+1 =  + xt +
X
i
(1 Dit)✓it , (2.15)
where Dit is an indicator variable, which takes on the value of one if group i defaults, and zero
otherwise. In addition, when the group i defaults, investors do not lend to countries in group i.
This condition is given by
✓it+1 = 0 (2.16)
if Dit = 1 for i = 1, 2.
The left hand side in equation (2.15) is expenditure of the investor: cInvt is investors’ consump-
tion, xt+1 is the amount of one period funds obtained from international financial markets, ✓it+1 is
the amount of group i0s bond holdings for the next period t+1, and Qit is the price of group i0s
sovereign bond, which atomistic investors take as given. The right hand side is investors’ current
wealth:   is investors’ current endowment, xt is the amount of funds carried over from the last
period t-1, and ✓it is the amount of group i’s bond holdings carried over from t-1. Note that if
Dit = 1, group i’s bond is erased from the investor’s budget constraint. In addition to this flow
budget constraint, the representative investor faces the following collateral constraint.
xt+1
1 + rf
   (
X
i
(1 Dit)Qit✓it+1) , (2.17)
where  is assumed to be in the range (0, 1).
The collateral constraint implies that the total value of loans can not exceed a fraction  of
the market value of the investor’s portfolio of sovereign bonds. That is, when borrowing from
international financial markets, investors must pledge collateral whose value depends on the value
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of the portfolio. This constraint restricts the leverage ratio, defined as the ratio of the total asset
to the net worth of investors, not to exceed 11  . This collateral constraint resembles most directly
a contract with a margin clause that investment banks face in the real world. Unlike sovereign
governments, investors are subject to domestic law, which allows creditors to confiscate investors’
valuable assets in the case of investors’ default, but to a limited extent ( < 1) mainly due to
informational and institutional frictions. As shown in other macro models with endogenous credit
constraints (e.g., Aiyagari and Gertler (1999), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Kocherlakota (2000),
and Mendoza (2010)), this constraint constitutes a financial friction that induces distortions via
credit-channel eﬀects, which is a main financial friction on the investor’s part in this model that has
potential to lead to contagion.
The representative investor maximizes the present discounted value of lifetime utility subject
to equation (2.15) and equation (2.17), taking the bond price for each group i, Qit, and default
decision Dit as given. The maximization problem yields the following Euler equations for loans from
the international financial market xt+1 and each sovereign bond i whose group is not in default,
✓it+1
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[xt+1] : u
0(cInvt ) =  inv(1 + rf )Et[u
0(cInvt+1)] + µt (2.18)
[✓it+1] : Q
i
t(u
0(cInvt )  µt) =  invE[u0(cInvt+1)(1 Dit+1)] (2.19)
µt denotes a Lagrange multiplier for the collateral constraint equation (2.17). Equation (2.19) can
be rewritten as qit = Et[ 
u0(cInvt+1)
(u0(cInvt ) µt)(1   D
i
t+1)]. With the collateral constraint, the investor’s
eﬀective stochastic discount factor is defined as mt+1 ⌘   u
0(ct+1)
(u0(ct) µ) . Then we have a typical asset
pricing function for the sovereign bond i:
Qit = Et[mt+1(1 Dit+1)] (2.20)
where (1 Dit+1) is a payoﬀ of the sovereign bond i in the next period.
External Financing Premium on Debt
If the collateral constraint (equation (2.17)) does not bind, the Euler equations characterizing in-
vestors’ optimality conditions collapse to the Euler equations as in standard asset pricing models.
However, when the collateral constraint binds, u0(cInvt ) >  inv(1+rf )Et[u0(cInvt+1)], implying that the
shadow value of additional funds (liquidity) from international financial markets increases compared
to the case in which the constraint does not bind, and that this increase is measured by a positive
Lagrange multiplier µt. Let Et[
u0(cInvt )
 invu0(cinvt+1)
] be the eﬀective real interest rate denoted by Rinvt+1 and
Rf ⌘ 1 + rf . Then, from the equation (2.18) we have:
Rinvt+1  Rf =
µt
Et[ invu0(cinvt+1)]
(2.21)
Again, if the collateral constraint does not bind, the eﬀective real interest rate represented by
the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution in consumption is equal to the gross risk-free rate
set at the international financial market. However, when it binds, the real eﬀective interest rate is
greater than the gross risk-free interest rate by µt
Et[ invu0(cinvt+1)]
. This term µt
Et[ invu0(cinvt+1)]
is called the
external financing premium on debt in the literature.
In determining the external financing premium, not only whether the collateral constraint binds
or not (whether µt is zero or not) matters, but also the degree to which the collateral constraint
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binds (how large µt is) matters. We can think of two cases to see the degree to which the collateral
constraint binds: (1) A bad income shock hits countries in group i, so incentives to default for the
countries in group i increase, but they do not default. In this case, a bad income shock lowers
the bond price Qit (i.e., a higher interest rate), so that it constrains investors’ borrowing through a
decrease in the value of collateral. Even if this makes the collateral constraint binding, the degree
to which the collateral constraint binds is not high. (2) However, if a bad income shock leads to the
group i’s default, then this inflicts a loss to investors’ net worth, and the investors want to borrow
more to smooth their consumption. But due to the binding collateral constraint, investors are not
able to borrow as much as they want. In this case (2) , the collateral constraint is more binding than
the case (1). The external financing premium on debt becomes larger (i.e., µt becomes larger), so
that credit constrained investors would ask for higher liquidity premiums on risky assets compared
to the case in which his collateral constraint is not very binding (case (1)).
To see the eﬀect of the external financing premium on bond prices for each government in both
groups, we now look at an expected excess return on each bond. If we define the expected excess
return on the sovereign bond i as RER ⌘ Et(Rit+1   Rf ), where Rit+1 ⌘ (1 Dit+1) 1Qt , an ex-post
gross return on sovereign bonds i, then we have the following expression for Ri,ER:
Ri,ER =
µt(1  )
(u0(ct)  µt)Et(mt+1)  
covt(mt+1, Rit+1)
Et(mt+1)
(2.22)
The first term on the right hand side of the equation (2.22) shows the direct eﬀect of the binding
of the collateral constraint on the excess return on sovereign bond i, as first shown in Aiyagari and
Gertler (1999) and extended to an open economy setting by Mendoza and Smith (2006). When the
collateral constraint binds, the first term on the right hand becomes positive due to the positive
µt, increasing the excess return on the sovereign bond i, which means a decrease in the bond price
Qit (i.e., an increase in the cost of borrowing for countries in group i) due to the external financing
premium. Moreover, when the collateral constraint binds, Covt(mt+1, Rit+1) in the second term on
the right hand side would be more negative because of the limited ability of investors to smooth
their consumption.
The equation (2.22) shows that the expected excess returns on sovereign bonds for both groups
have one thing in common when the collateral constraint binds: the liquidity premium term
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µt(1 )
(u0(ct) µt)Et(mt+1) . Hence, if group i’s default or bad economic conditions make the investors
credit (liquidity) constrained by making the collateral constraint binding, investors ask for liquidity
premiums on group i’s bonds as well as the other group  i’s bonds , thereby increasing the cost
of borrowings for the countries in group  i. This is the main financial channel on the lender’s
side through which a sovereign default risk spreads to other countries even when their domestic
fundamentals have not worsened. Note that in this model, bad income shocks to countries not only
make sovereign governments credit constrained through an increase in the cost of borrowing but
also make investors credit or liquidity constrained because of the collateral constraint.
The investors’ problem can be rewritten recursively:
V Inv(✓1t , ✓
2
t , xt, St) = max
cInvt ,✓
1
t+1,✓
2
t+1,xt+1
u(cInvt ) +  
invEt[V
Inv(✓1t+1, ✓
2
t+1, xt+1, St+1)] , (2.23)
subject to the following constraints:
cInvt +
1
1 + rf
xt+1 +
X
i=1,2
Qi(St)(1 Dit(St))✓it+1 =  + xt +
X
i=1,2
(1 Dit(St))✓it (2.24)
xt+1
1 + rf
   
X
i=1,2
(1 Dit(St))Qi(St)✓it+1 (2.25)
✓it+1 = 0 if D
i
t(St) = 1 for i = 1, 2 , (2.26)
where Qi(St) = qi(Bit+1(St), St), where Bit+1 is an aggregate bond holding for group i the next
period.
Investors also take as given a law of motion for the aggregate state variables St and default
decision functions for each group Dit:
St+1 =  (St) (2.27)
D1t =  1(St) (2.28)
D2t =  2(St) (2.29)
The bond price function for each country in group i must be consistent with the Euler equation
for the asset i, equation (2.19) and each government’s default function di(·). Then, the bond price
function qi(bit+1, St) that each government in group i faces is given by
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qi(bit+1, St) = Et[ inv
u0(cInvt+1(St+1))
u0(cInvt (St))  µt(St)
(1  d(bit+1, B1t+1, B2t+1, Y 1t+1, Y 2t+1, Xt+1))] (2.30)
Discussion of Contagion Mechanism
The financial friction that each agent faces determines the endogenous credit limits for each agent.
Due to the possibility of default associated with the lack of enforcement in sovereign debt, a sovereign
government pays higher interest rates, which reflect the likelihood of its future default. On the other
hand, the capacity of investors to obtain funds from international financial markets is restricted by
the collateral constraint. In this model, two endogenous credit conditions interact, finally generating
contagion when a bad fundamental shock triggers a crisis. If a bad income shock to country A
triggers the collateral constraint to bind for the investors (i.e., margin call), this adversely aﬀects
borrowing costs for the other country B. This, in turn, will increase incentives to default for the
other country B, which will, in turn, be reflected in an increase in sovereign spreads for the country
B. Furthermore, if a country A defaults on its debt due to a very bad income shock, this will make
the investors very credit constrained (which is associated with a high positive value of the Lagrange
multiplier µt), and then they will ask for high liquidity premiums on other sovereign governments.
In the face of the high cost of borrowing, the other sovereign government B finds the value of
repayment or borrowing from investors low compared to the value of default, so that it decides to
default. This, in turn, makes investors more credit constrained, generating a vicious spiral. This
financial channel that arises from two financial frictions is a source of amplification of fundamental
shocks, generating a contagion of sovereign default risks across countries.
2.5 Equilibrium
The equilibrium concept in this economy is a recursive Markov perfect equilibrium. That is, the
equilibrium default and borrowing decisions for governments as well as the decision functions for
investors depend only on payoﬀ relevant state variables.13 In the following definition of the equilib-
13A Markov perfect equilibrium is necessary to prevent time-inconsistency problems of governments’ decisions.
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rium, x and x0 denote any variable x at period t and t+1, respectively.
A recursive Markov perfect equilibrium for this economy consists of
1. Policy and value functions for governments and households in each group i : consumpition for
households ci(bi, S), debt choices b0i(bi, S), default decision di(bi, S), and the value functions
vind(b
i, S), vid(b
i, S), and vio(bi, S) for each group i = 1, 2.
2. Policy and value functions for investors: consumption cInv(✓1, ✓2, x, S), asset choices ✓0i(✓1, ✓2, x, S) for i =
1, 2, loans from international financial markets, x0(✓1, ✓2, x, S), and the value function V Inv(✓1, ✓2, x, S)
3. Bond Price functions : the bond price function that each sovereign government in group i faces
qi(bi, S) and the equilibrium bond prices Qi(S) that atomistic investors take as given.
4. Law of motion for aggregate state variables : X 0(S), Di(S) ,and B0i(S) for i = 1, 2.
5. such that
(a) Taking as given the bond price function qi(b0i, S) and the law of motion for aggregate
state variables, ci(bi, S), b0i(bi, S), di(bi, S) solves value functions vind(b
i, S), vid(b
i, S), and
vio(b
i, S).
(b) Taking as given the bond price Qi(S) and the law of motion for aggregate state variables,
cInv(✓1, ✓2, x, S), ✓0i(✓1, ✓2, x, S), and x0(✓1, ✓2, x, S) solves the value function V Inv(✓1, ✓2, x, S)
.
(c) The bond price function for bond i qi(b0i, S) satisfies the equation (2.30).
(d) Market Clearing Condition: ✓0i( B1, B2, X, S) =  B
0
i(S) and Qi(S) = qi(B0i(S), S) for
i = 1, 2.
(e) Aggregate Consistency:
B0i = b
0
i(B
i, B1, B2, Y 1, Y 2, Xt) if D
i
t = 0 for i = 1, 2 (2.31)
Di = di(Bi, B1, B2, Y 1, Y 2, X) for i = 1, 2 (2.32)
X 0 = x0( B1, B2, X,B1, B2, Y 1, Y 2, X) (2.33)
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3 Quantitative Analysis
3.1 Solution Method
The model framework developed in the previous section is solved numerically to examine quantita-
tive predictions of the model, with a focus on whether the model can generate excessive comovements
of sovereign spreads between two countries similar to the ones observed during the recent European
debt crisis. As a representative small open economy in each group, Spain and Greece are chosen and
the model is calibrated to the two countries. Due to a fair number of state variables in the model,
parallel computing using 16 CPUs is used to solve the model. The algorithm for the numerical so-
lution combines features of the solution method by Heaton and Lucas (1996), Menodza and Smith
(2006), Arellano (2008), and Hatchondo, Martinez, and Sapriza (2010). A sovereign government’s
problem in each group is solved using value function iteration with linear interpolation similar to
Hatchondo, Martinez, and Sapriza (2010).14 The investors’ problem is solved using policy function
iteration on investors’ Euler equation with linear interpolation. Appendix 1 contains a detailed
algorithm for the numerical solution.
3.2 Parameterization
For the quantitative work, the following specific functional forms are used.
• Endowment process for Greece and Spain:
log(Y it+1) = (1  ⇢i)µie + ⇢iylog(Y it ) + ✏it+1 (3.1)
where 0 < ⇢i < 1 and ✏it s N(0, 2✏,i) and i={Greece, Spain}.
• Utility Function: u(ci) = ci,1  /(1   ) for i=Greece, Spain, and investors.
• The output cost of default in the event of default is given by:
hi(Y ) = max{0, d0Y + di1Y 2}, di1   0. (3.2)
14As Pouzo and Presno(2012) argues, there is convergence problem in numerical solutions associated with solving
the quantitative model of default with risk-averse investors using Discrete State Space(DSS) method. However,
Hatchondo, Martinez, and Sapriza(2010) use a spline function instead of linear interpolation.
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The specification for the output cost of default hi(Y ) is taken from Chaterjee and Eyigungor (2011).
Table 2 and 3 report the parameter values used for quantitative analysis in this paper. Table 2
reports the values of the parameters that have counterparts in the data or are taken from the
previous studies. Table 3 reports the values of parameters to be calibrated to match default rates
for Greece and Spain.
Parameters Calibrated Outside the Model:
A period in the model is a quarter. The parameters of the endowment process for Greece and
Spain are separately estimated on quadratic detrended quartely real GDP data for each country
from 1980:1-2011:1.15 Both country’s real mean GDP per capita is normalized to be one by setting
µie =  12 2✏,i. The estimated value of ⇢e for Greece (Spain) is 0.87 (0.89), respectively, and the
value of  i✏ is 2.44% (2.38%). An income shock process for each country is discretized with 9 shocks
following Tauchen and Hussey (1991). The risk-free rate rf is set at 0.01, which corresponds to a
quarterly interest rate of 1% and is standard in the literature. Risk aversion parameter   is set equal
to 2 for both lenders and borrowers and is also standard in the literature. Lenders’ time discount
factor  inv is set to be 0.98 such that  inv(1 + rf ) < 1, to have a well defined stochastic steady
state for xt.16 Each country’s time discount factor is set to be 0.917 and is from Arellano and Bai
(2012). The parameter that determines the leverage ratio  is set to be 0.75 and is from Aiyagari
and Gertler (1999). Investors’ period income is not easy to pin down. However, it is set to be five,
meaning that foreign investors’ period income is five times higher than households’ income in each
country. Hence, more patient ( Inv >  i) and wealthier (  > E(Y i)) investors lend to sovereign
governments in this model.
Parameters Calibrated to Match Target Moments:
The parameters determining the output cost of default (d0, d1) are calibrated to match the default
rate for Greece and Spain in the last 100 years. Since a sovereign default is a rare event, it is very
15The real GDP data are deseasonalized and is taken from Eurostat.
16If  (1 + rf ) 1, the asset for investors xt+1 will diverge to infinity in equilibrium by Doob’s supermartingale
convergence theorem.
17The value of   in the quantitative sovereign default literature ranges from 0.8 to 0.95.
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Table 2: Parameters Calibrated outside the Model
Investor Notation value Borrowers Notation Greece Spain
Time discount factor  inv 0.98 Time discount factor  i 0.90 0.90
Risk Aversion   2.00 Risk Aversion   2 2
Quarterly Risk Free rate rf 0.01 Endowment Shock persistence ⇢iy 0.87 0.89
Margin Requirement  0.75 Endowment Shock s.d  i✏ 2.44% 2.38%
Endowment   5 Mean log endowment µiy   12 2✏,i   12 2✏,i
Table 3: Parameters Calibrated to Match Target Moments
Output Cost Greece Spain Target Moment
d0 -0.30 -0.30 Greece’s default rate:2%
di1 0.40 0.45 Spain’s default rate: 1%
diﬃcult to estimate default rates for each country. However, in the last 100 years, Greece defaulted
twice including the current debt crisis, and Spain defaulted once.18 Using a sample of 68 countries
since 1970, Cruces and Trebesch (2011) find an annual frequency of 6.6 defaults. Because Spain
is one of high income countries and Greece is one of mid-income countries, the default rate of one
percent for Spain and two percent for Greece may be justified.19
Since we have two target moments but there are two parameters determining each country’s
output cost of default (i.e., there are a total of four parameters to be calibrated), the same value is
used for do for both countries, but di1 is chosen to be diﬀerent for each country to match the target
moments.
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Figure 3.1: Default Region for Greece and Spain (Di(B1t , B2t , Y 1t , Y 2t , Xt)
3.3 Quantitative Result
Default Region
Figure 3 shows default regions for Greece and Spain in endowment and debt/GDP space. The
darkly shaded region in the left panel represents combinations of endowment realizations and a
debt/mean GDP ratio for which Greek government optimally decides to default, with Spain’s debt
and endowment realization, and funds obtained last period Xt for investors at a mean level in
simulations. The lightly shaded region is accordingly the non-default region in which the Greek
government decides to repay the debt. Likewise, the right panel in Figure 2 represents the default
and non-default region for the Spanish government.
For a given realization of the endowment, each government is more likely to default with more
debt. Along the other dimension, for a given level of debt, each government is less likely to default
with higher endowment realizations. This prediction of the model is consistent with empirical
evidence that sovereign default mostly occurs with bad income states and high indebtedness of
countries. It is worth noting that the default region for Greece is larger than and covers the default
region for Spain, because the model is calibrated to generate a higher default rate for Greece than
for Spain.
18Greek government’s last default occured in 1932, and Spain’s last default occured in 1936 according to Reinhart
and Rogoﬀ (2010).
19There are many empirical studies that suggest a strongly negative correlation between default rates and income
levels for countries.
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Figure 3.2: Spain’s Default Regions in the Case of Greece’s Default
Figure 4 compares default regions for Spain in which Greece defaults and does not default. Two
default regions for Spain overlap in the same endowment and debt space. A grey default region
that is larger than and covers a darkly shaded region is the one for the case of Greece’s default.
As we have seen in the previous section, if Greece’s default makes investors more credit-constrained
(i.e., the collateral constraint binds), investors ask for higher borrowing costs to Spain, and this
increase in borrowing costs for Spain reinforces incentives to default for Spain. The fact that
Spain’s default region for the case of Greece’s default is larger than and covers the default region in
which Greece does not default, shows that the increase in the cost of borrowing for Spain caused by
Greece’s default increases incentives to default for Spain through investors’ credit conditions. This
is consistent with the contagion channel discussed in the previous section.
Bond Price Function
Figure 5 plots bond price functions (qi(bit+1, B1t , B2t , Y 1t , Y 2t , Xt)) for Greece as a function of its
borrowing choice for the next period for the good and bad realization of the endowment, fixing the
current debt for Group 1 and Group 2 (B1 and B2) and Xt at the mean level in the simulation.
The bond price is the inverse of the gross interest rate on the bonds (debt). The good shock is a
realization that is 0.5 standard deviation above the unconditional mean of the endowment shock,
and the bad shock is -0.5 standard deviation below the unconditional mean of the endowment shock
for Greece. As seen in the default region in Figure 3, the country is more likely to default with
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Figure 3.3: Bond Price Function(Greece): qi(bit+1, B1t , B2t , Y 1t , Y 2t , Xt)
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more debt. Taking this into account, investors charge higher interest rates when debt is larger,
so that bond prices decrease in the amount of borrowing for the next period. At any given level
of debt choice, Greece faces a higher bond price (low interest rates) for the good shock than for
the bad shock. This result is related to persistence in the endowment shock process. With a high
persistence (⇢Greecee = 0.87) of the shock process, today’s good shock implies that Greece is likely
to receive a good shock tomorrow. Hence, investors expect a low probability of default for Greece
for the next period. Because of the low likelihood of default the next period, investors accordingly
charge a lower interest rate on Greek bonds compared to the case of a bad shock today. Hence, in
the face of a good shock, Greece can borrow more at almost risk-free rates than in the face of a bad
shock today, implying that the likelihood of default risk endogenously determines Greece’s credit
limit each period.
Figure 6 compares the bond price functions for Greece and Spain in the case when both countries
receive a good income shock (0.5 s.d above the unconditional mean). Since the model is calibrated
so that Greece defaults twice as often as Spain in simulations, at any given level of its debt choice,
Spain faces more lenient interest rates than Greece.
Now see how Spain’s borrowing condition is aﬀected by the investors’ credit conditions. Figure
7 compares bond price functions for Spain between the cases when the collateral constraint for
investors binds and does not bind. In both cases, Spain receives a bad income shock at the current
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Figure 3.4: Bond Price functions for Greece and Spain
state of the world. The case when the collateral constraint binds refers to the situation when
Greece’s default induces investors to become credit constrained. The bond price schedule for the
case in which the collateral constraint binds is strictly lower than for the no-binding case over all
the range of debt levels. This implies that when investors become credit constrained, they ask for
higher interest rates to the Spanish government, and this, in turn, reinforces incentives to default
for Spanish government. As we have seen in Section 3, when the collateral constraint binds, credit
constrained (liquidity constrained) investors ask for an additional liquidity premium on all the
bonds in his portfolio, thereby increasing the cost of borrowing for Spain. Figure 7 shows a financial
channel in this model through which Greece’s default risk spreads to Spain, by worsening investors’
credit conditions. In equilibrium, the credit condition for each agent (borrowers and lenders) is
mutually reinforcing each other to generate contagion.
Event Study
To see whether the model can generate “excessive” comovements of sovereign spreads between Greece
and Spain during the crisis, the event study techniques to simulated time series data are applied.
Figure 8 plots the model’s average path of annualized spreads in percentage terms for Greece and
Spain. Spreads are defined as each country’s interest rates minus a gross risk free interest rate
(1 + rf ). The event window covers 16 quarters up to and including Greece’s default date, with
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Figure 3.5: Bond Price Functions for Spain (with a Bad shock and Greece’s Default)
Greece’s default dates normalized to date 0 in the figure. I conduct 1000 simulations with each
simulation of 400 periods (100 years). A sequence of each country’s income shocks is fed into the
model, and when Greece’s default is detected, a pair of sequences of simulated spreads for Greece
and Spain within the event window are selected. At each pair of sequences in each simulation, I
compute a cross-country correlation in spreads between Greece and Spain and take an average of
correlations over 1000 simulations. The crisis period in this event study is defined as one year up
to and including Greece’s default (date 0), and the stable period is defined as 3 years before the
crisis period. Hence the simulated spread line for each country represents the average behavior of
spreads around the default in the model.
This event study shows that the model can generate a significant increase in a cross-country
correlations between Greece and Spain during the crisis period. On average, the cross-country
correlation during the stable period (-15 to -4) is 0.18, while the cross-country correlation during
the crisis period (-3 to 0) is 0.43. And this increase is statistically significant with a t-value of
4.21 in a t-test for a diﬀerence in means for two samples. This result is consistent with the one
observed in the data: the cross-country correlation between Greece and Spain increased from 0.23
to 0.68 during the crisis period in the real data as shown in Table 1 in Introduction.20 Moreover,
Spain’s default probability conditional on Greece’s default in the simulation increases from 1% (the
20It must be noted, however, that the time window and data frequency for the simulation and the empirical data
are diﬀerent so that these two numbers are not directly comparable.
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Figure 3.6: Average Spread Dynamics around Greece’s default
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unconditional default rate for Spain in the simulation) to 3.2%, which suggests that Greece’s default
induces Spain’s default by increasing the cost of borrowing for Spain through the financial channel
linked to the investors’ credit conditions.
Due to the persistence of the income shock process, an initial bad income shock to Greece,
which finally leads to her default at date 0, starts at dates around -2 or -3. This initial bad shock
makes the collateral constraint midly binding through a decrease in Greek bond prices. Hence, the
common liquidity premium represented by the first term on the right hand side in the equation
(2.22) is shared by both Greek and Spanish bonds even before Greece’s default at date 0. However,
when a very bad shock hits Greece at date 0, the Greek government defaults on its debt, and this
makes the collateral constraint for investors very binding, so that investors ask for a high liquidity
premium on Spanish bonds. Facing high borrowing costs, Spain is more likely to default than when
Greece does not default. Note that even when Spain does not default at date 0, Spain faces a higher
cost of borrowing, which is shown by a sudden increase in sovereign spreads for Spain at date 0 in
Figure 8. Hence, the liquidity premium shared by both countries in this model is a main driver of
comovements of sovereign spreads during a crisis period.
A counterfactual analysis is conducted to see how crucial the financial channel proposed in this
paper is for generating contagion. With the same parameter values in the benchmark model, I
assume that investors are risk-neutral and are not subject to a collateral constraint, and conduct
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Figure 3.7: Average Spread Dynamics with Risk-Neutral Investors and No Collateral Constraint
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the same event studies as in the Figure 8. This assumptions regarding foreign investors in the
counterfactual analysis are common in quantitative studies of sovereign default built upon Eaton
and Gersovitz (1981). Figure 9 shows the average path of sovereign spreads for Greece and Spain
under these assumptions. As can be seen from the figure, there is no increase in the cross-country
correlations in sovereign spreads between Greece and Spain, even when Greece defaulted at date 0.
The correlation coeﬃcient during the stable period is -0.02 and during the crisis period is -0.01. The
diﬀerence in correlation coeﬃcients is not statistically significant with a t-value of approximately
zero. This shows that the financial friction on the part of investors plays an important role in
generating contagion in my model. Besides, the average spreads for both countries in Figure 9
over the entire period are lower than those in Figure 8. This reflects the fact that with risk-averse
investors, there are additional risk-premiums attached to bond prices.
4 Conclusions
This paper proposes a new financial channel through which one country’s default risk spills over to
other countries. Unlike other studies on financial contagion, this paper focuses on a unique feature
of sovereign default in explaining contagion of sovereign default: lack of enforcement in sovereign
debt contracts. Unlike other studies on sovereign debt and default, this paper put more structures
on foreign creditors: foreign creditors are risk-averse and face a financial friction that determines
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their credit conditions. Furthermore, this paper shows that the interaction of each agent’s credit
condition associated with financial frictions is the key to generating contagion similar to the one
observed in the recent European debt crisis.
Theoretically, I develop a model in which liquidity premiums demanded by credit constrained
investors are a main driver of comovements in sovereign spreads across countries during a crisis.
In the model, a crisis starts with a bad fundamental shock to one country, but this bad shock
is amplified through the financial channel, aﬀecting credit conditions for both lenders and other
sovereign borrowers and possibly generating a bad spiral along which we see contagion. Quantita-
tively, the model is calibrated to Greece and Spain to examine the model’s predictions. Quantitative
results well match empirical facts regarding the recent European crisis: cross-country correlation in
sovereign spreads between Greece and Spain increases significantly during a crisis period. Spain’s
default rate, conditional on Greece’s default, increases around three times compared to Spain’s
unconditional default rate.
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Appendix: Computational Algorithm
1. Start with an initial set of parameters.
2. Conjecture an initial guess of a bond price function for each group qi0(bit+1, St), a law of motion
for aggregate state variables Bi0,t+1, decision functions Di0,t , and X0,t+1. Subscript 0 denotes
the number of iteration.
3. Solve an individual government problem in each group:
(a) Taking as given the law of motion for aggregate state variables and aggregate decision
functions as well as qio(bit+1, St), solve for a government’s policy functions in each group i
{bij,t+1(bit, B1t , B2t , Y 1t , Y 2t , Xt), dij,t(bit, B1t , B2t , Y 1t , Y 2t , Xt)} via value function iteration in
the Bellman equations (equations 2.5, 2.7) with linear interpolation similar to Hatchondo,
Martinez, and Sapriza (2010). Again, subscript j denotes the number of iteration.
(b) Using the policy functions in the previous step, update the eﬀective law of motions for
aggregate variables and decision functions: Bij+1,t+1 = bij,t+1(Bit, B1t , B2t , Y 1t , Y 2t , Xt) and
Dij+1,t = d
i
j,t(B
i
t, B
1
t , B
2
t , Y
1
t , Y
2
t , Xt) for i = 1, 2.
4. Solve investors’ problem:
(a) After solving the government’s problem, we have each group’s default decision function
Di(St), policy functions for bond holdings Bit+1(St), and the bond price Qi(Bit+1(St), St)
for each group. Imposing these conditions on the Euler equation (2.18), solve for in-
vestors’ decision functions CInv(·), Xt+1(St), and a Lagrange multiplier µt(St) by policy
function iteration with linear interpolation. When solving the investors’ Euler equation,
the collateral constraint is assumed to be non-binding first, but if the resulting Xt+1(St)
violates the collateral constraint equation (2.17), the collateral constraint is imposed with
equaility.
(b) Construct a stochastic discount factor  Inv u
0(cInvt+1(St+1))
u0(cInvt (St)) µt(St) using the optimal consump-
tion functions for investors and the Lagrange multiplier, and update bond price functions
for each group as in eq (2.30).
(c) Check the convergence conditions:
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i. ||qij+1(bit+1, St)-qij(bit+1, St)|| < ✏, for alli
ii. ||Bij+1,t+1  Bij,t+1|| < ✏ , for all i.
iii. ||Dij+1,t+1  Dij,t+1|| < ✏ , for all i.
iv. ||Xj,t+1  Xj,t+1|| < ✏
(d) if (i,ii,iii, iv) are satisfied, then go to step (5). Otherwise, go back to step (3-(a)) with the
updated bond price functions qij+1and updated decision functions Bij+1,t+1 and Xj+1,t+1.
When updating these functions, Gauss-Siedel algorithm is used to prevent the well-known
problem of unstable “hog-cycles”.
5. Get the target moments by simulating the model with a given set of parameters. If the
simulated moments are equal to the target moments, stop. Otherwise, go back to step (1)
with a modifed set of parameters.
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